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Making Meaning Manifest

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In recent work Sperber and Wilson expand on ideas initially presented in Relevance (1986) and flesh out continua between showing and meaning, and determinate and indeterminate content. Drawing on Sperber and Wilson's work, and at points defending it from what I see as potential objections, I present a Schema of Communicative Acts (SCA) that includes an additional third continuum between linguistic and non-linguistic content. The SCA clears the way for consideration of what exactly is meant by showing, the motivations of speakers, how affect impacts expression, and metaphor. The SCA allows us to consider not only how but why we engage in certain forms of communicative behavior, and captures the incredible nuance of human interactions: said and meant, linguistic and non-linguistic, determinate and indeterminate.

Keywords: Sperber and Wilson, Grice, meaning, showing, determinate, indeterminate, linguistic, non-linguistic, metaphor, affect.

1. Introduction

Every philosophy of language is distinguished not just by its theoretical core but by the sorts of cases that it considers for explanation. The pragmatic tradition, which includes work by philosophers such as H. P. Grice, Dan Sperber, and Deirdre Wilson, stands apart from predecessors in part because of engagement with how we actually use language, “in the wild”—with meanings and to achieve aims that are not explicitly stated, but suggested or implicated. Language is not best understood in terms of coding meanings, as Sperber and Wilson convincingly argue in the introduction to their 1986 book *Relevance*, but on a continuum with other communicative acts.

The work of Sperber and Wilson builds on the tradition Grice began in the 1950s. In work published in a 2015 edition of the *Croatian Journal of Philosophy* Sperber and Wilson expand on some ideas initially presented in *Relevance*. In (2015) paper Sperber and Wilson expand

their theory to explicitly consider cases of meaning as well as showing, and discuss acts with determinate as well as indeterminate content. Sperber and Wilson's work is remarkable for its willingness to explain acts not just of ordinary utterances but also "ostensive" acts such as sniffing the seaside in a way that makes it clear the sniffer is "sharing an impression" with her audience.

In this same spirit, I expand further on the account presented by Sperber and Wilson, and defend it from what I see as a possible misconstrual of their view. The theoretical framework presented by Sperber and Wilson brings to light some important questions for their account: What does the distinction between meaning and showing amount to? Is this distinction tantamount to a distinction between expressing content linguistically or non-linguistically? Why do we in some circumstances mean/state propositions and why in others do we show evidence? Is this a conscious decision? What is the relationship between conscious awareness and meaning/showing more broadly? I will respond to these questions and will consider a number of communicative acts that go beyond the sorts of cases that are ordinarily considered by philosophers of language—such as utterances that express affective states. I argue that with the clarifications I propose the Sperber and Wilson account has the latitude to account for such acts.

2. Gricean intentions

Grice's theory of speaker meaning is known to be complex. As characterized by Sperber and Wilson (2015), on Grice's view:

In order to mean something by an utterance, the utterer must intend the addressee,

- 1) to produce a particular response r
- 2) to think (recognise) that the utterer intends (1)
- 3) to fulfil (1) on the basis of his fulfilment of (2) (118)

What is important about Grice's view is the way that meaning may go beyond the literal words uttered. For example, consider a scenario in which someone taps the person in the row in front of them at the theater and utters

(A) "I cannot see over your hat".

It would be surprising if the person in the hat simply said "Oh I am sorry to hear that, but thanks for letting me know", and turned back around in their seat. The first speaker was not intending to simply inform the hat-wearer of a fact. Here the intended response—which will be readily available to any competent hearer—is the hearer will remove his or her hat. It is by the hearer recognizing that this is what the utterer intends that the hearer will remove his or her hat. That is, to put it in terms of Grice's view as stated above, the hearer will (2) recognize that the speaker intends to get the hearer (1) to remove the hat and will (3) fulfill the request (1), removing the hat, on the basis of the

fulfillment of (2), the recognition of that intention. This sounds complex but any witness to the exchange would expect the hearer to remove his or her hat, an expectation that demonstrates an understanding of such an intention on the part of the speaker.

The complexity of Grice's proposal has led to criticisms. Jennifer Hornsby, for example, writes the following of Grice's theory:

I think that this ought to seem ludicrous. Real people regularly get things across with their utterances; but real people do not regularly possess, still less act upon, intentions of this sort...notice that an enormous amount would be demanded of hearers, as well as speakers, if such complex intentions really were needed to say things. (Hornsby 2000: 95)

The complexity of the Gricean account does raise questions. Are we supposed to spell out all the intentions required for speaker meaning in our head? If so, need we be conscious of doing this? Wouldn't that take a long time? If not, in virtue of what can it be said that some speaker really has such an intention? Or, to put it in Gricean terms, can there be unconscious m-intentions?

Further complicating things are a number of familiar cases where it seems any relevant intention would need to be more elaborate than the hat case. Metaphors such as,

(B) "Juliet is the sun"

might be taken to express a range of propositions, but not including that Juliet is a giant ball of gas. Must a speaker have intended all of the acceptable propositions the metaphor can be said to express? Is it *that* intention in virtue of which they *are* acceptable? If not, what is the reason for their acceptability?

One case Grice considers is the letter of recommendation example, where an utterer conveys that a job candidate, Mr. X, is no good by writing a very short letter of recommendation stating simply that the candidate is on time and is a competent speaker of English (Grice 1989: 33). In this example, the speaker flouts the maxim of quantity to communicate by conversational implicature (Grice 1989: 33). There are other cases, of a sort that Grice does not consider, where an attitude is conveyed, but it is not by means of conversational implicature (which requires intentional flouting on the part of the speaker).

Slips of the tongue do not fall neatly within the Gricean picture. Consider the following example from Davidson,

(C) 'We are all cremated equal' (Davidson 2006: 251).

Are we justified in coming to the conclusion that this speaker *meant* something about death? Or should we say instead that they intended to say 'created'—not 'cremated'—and thus ignore what seems to be revealed through the utterance?

The following case, in which the speaker reveals a negative attitude, is from István Kecskés,

- (D) Roy: Are you okay?
 Mary: I'm fine, Roy.
 Roy: I would have believed you if you hadn't said 'Roy'.
 (Kecskes 2014: 2016)

A proficient speaker will recognize that Mary is not fine. As Kecskés draws attention to with this example, there is something about stating someone's name at the end of such a sentence that expresses displeasure. A noteworthy thing about this case is that it may or *may not* have been Mary's intention to convey her displeasure here. In fact, Mary's intention is not relevant to the determination that the speaker is not fine. This means that this content is expressed by a means other than Gricean implicature of the sort that follows the three-pronged framework, as illustrated by case A.

Case D is one that ordinary hearers can pick up on. There are also cases where some expressed content requires a more trained hearer to pick up on. The following is taken from Bezuidenhout (2001), who is expanding on Stern (2000)

- (E) A young woman Marie, who is in psychotherapy because she is suffering from anorexia nervosa, tells her therapist that her mother has forbidden her to see her boyfriend. Referring to her mother's injunction, Marie utters:

[1] I won't swallow that

Here 'swallow' is being used metaphorically, and Stern suggests that the content of Marie's utterance (the proposition she expressed) can be paraphrased as

[2] Marie won't accept her mother's injunction.

Given her eating disorder, it seems significant that Marie chose to frame her comment about her mother's injunction by using the word 'swallow'. But once we've accessed the metaphorical interpretation it seems that we've lost the echoes of meaning that might connect what she is saying to her eating disorder and hence to any problems that she might be having with her mother connected to this disorder. (Bezuidenhout 2001: 33–34)

As Bezuidenhout points out in this passage if we interpret metaphors in terms of their literal content then we miss out on shades of meaning that seem to be conveyed by the specifics of the metaphor used. Do we need a theory that allows us to say that Marie really did *mean* something about her eating disorder here, although she may not have consciously intended it? Again, if she did mean something about her mother's eating disorder, it is not because of a complex three-pronged Gricean intention. Indeed, it is precisely her lack of awareness of this connection that a skilled therapist would work to identify and point out to her.

Cases B–E are the sort that can prove problematic for any philosophy of language. Metaphor, as in case B, has received a great deal of

attention in the literature, and slips of the tongue have received a fair amount. Less present in the analytic, and certainly Gricean literature, is consideration of cases such as D and E. I will return to consider these cases in a later section. I will approach them as a part of my proposed Schema of Communicative Acts, which will build on the work of Sperber and Wilson. Before we can get to that point I will present the Sperber and Wilson account.

3. Sperber and Wilson's proposal

In their 2015 paper "Beyond Speaker's Meaning" Sperber and Wilson present new applications for their notion of ostensive-inferential communication that go beyond what is normally taken as the purview of philosophy of language. Ostensive-inferential communication makes use of just the first two conditions of Grice's theory of speaker meaning; Sperber and Wilson write that is more "conceptually unified" and "does a better job of explaining how utterances are interpreted than a standard Gricean approach" (117).

On the Sperber and Wilson ostensive-inferential view, in order to mean something by an utterance, the utterer must intend the addressee,

- 1) to produce a particular response r
- 2) to think (recognise) that the utterer intends (1)

Note here that the third Gricean condition has been dropped. Sperber and Wilson explain their dropping the third clause in the following way:


In characterising ostensive communication, we built on the first two clauses of Grice's definition and dropped the third...because it seemed obvious that there is a continuum of cases between 'meaning that' (typically achieved by the use of language) and displaying evidence that (in other words, showing) and we wanted our account of communication to cover both. (119)

Sperber and Wilson believe that by dropping the third clause—that the recognition of the speaker's intention be *the basis* for a hearer to produce some response—their account covers not only 'meaning that' but 'showing that'.


The central component of the Sperber and Wilson theory—Relevance Theory—is the presumption of relevance. The presumption of relevance is, roughly, the idea that when someone makes an utterance we assume that they have deemed it to be relevant to the conversation, and this knowledge helps us interpret it (Sperber and Wilson 1986). Relevance is one of Grice's four conversational maxims of quantity, quality, relation and manner, which for Grice interact, and the upholding of one often explains why another is violated (Grice 1989; Johnson 2016). In a nutshell of Sperber and Wilson's theory is that relevance alone can do the work that Grice divided into the four maxims. Ostensive-inferential communication is communication that a speaker has deemed relevant.



In both the Sperber and Wilson and the Grice characterization, a meaningful utterance is made to “produce a particular response r” in the hearer. This response can be 1) performing a physical action, such as removing a hat, or going away (Grice 1989: 96), or 2) simply coming to have a mental state, such as believing a certain proposition. In other words, the Gricean and Sperber and Wilson accounts can be understood as ways to get others to respond—be that by believing certain things or behaving in certain ways.

Sperber and Wilson go on to consider examples such as ‘Juliet is the sun’ (2015: 120). Such cases lead Sperber and Wilson to add to their first distinction between showing and meaning—as follows from their dropping of Grice’s third clause—with a second distinction, between cases with more or less determinate meaning. A continuum along this distinction is mapped onto the first continuum. They end up with a plane that looks like this:






From here Sperber and Wilson proceed to give examples of utterances or behaviors that fall on each of these nine points. These are presented below, beginning with determinate content that is on different points of the meaning-showing continuum (F–H below).







From Sperber and Wilson they present three cases that are between determinate and indeterminate content, and across the meaning-showing continuum (I-K).





And lastly, we are presented with indeterminate content, across the meaning-showing range (L–N).





These examples help illustrate what Sperber and Wilson have in mind with these two distinctions between meaning and showing, and between determinate and indeterminate content.

4. *Making manifest and sharing an impression*

With determinate content the response a speaker intends to cause in the hearer is relatively straightforward. With the hat example (A) it was clear that the speaker wanted the hearer to remove his or her hat. With acts on the indeterminate side of the Sperber and Wilson continuum it is much less clear what is going on.

In their 1986 book *Relevance: Communication and Cognition* Sperber and Wilson consider the following case, which is an instance of indeterminate content:


- O: Mary and Peter are newly arrived at the seaside. She opens the window overlooking the sea and sniffs appreciatively and ostensively. When Peter follows suit, there is no one particular good thing that comes to his attention: the air smells fresh, fresher than it did in town, it reminds him of their previous holidays, he can smell the sea, seaweed, ozone, fish; all sorts of pleasant things come to mind, and while, because her sniff was appreciative, he is reasonably safe in assuming that she must have

intended him to notice at least some of them, he is unlikely to be able to pin down her intentions any further. (1986: 55)

In this example Mary behaves in a way that makes it clear that she would like Peter to appreciate the seaside. It is not clear precisely what response she hopes to engender in Peter once he turns his attention to the seaside. If we attempted to spell out which Gricean response, r, Mary has in mind—be it that Peter come to accept some proposition as being true or to perform some action such as taking off a hat—we would fall short.

To address this Mary example¹ Sperber and Wilson present their notion of sharing an impression. They write that if Mary were pressed on what she intended to convey to Peter “one of the best answers” would be that she wanted to share an impression. Cases such as O, where the speaker’s meaning is not determinate, cannot be paraphrased without loss (2015: 122).

We can map this notion of sharing an impression on the right side of the Sperber and Wilson plane:



When we express indeterminate content we share an expression.


Sharing an impression is contrasted with the notion of making manifest. When some content, p is shown or meant, this is the sort of thing that makes p more manifest on the Sperber and Wilson picture.

They write, “A proposition is manifest to an individual at a given time to the extent that he is likely to some positive degree to entertain it and accept it as true” (134). Manifestness is an *epistemic* notion. In their eyes, “the notion of mutual manifestness is more realistic, more psychologically relevant, and at least as cogent as the notions of mutual knowledge, common knowledge, or common ground” (135). For something to be made manifest it must become salient to the hearer. ‘Salience’ here is what they called ‘accessibility’ in *Relevance* (2015: 133). In short,

$$\text{Manifestness} = \text{epistemic strength} + \text{salience} \quad (2015: 133)$$

¹ Unfortunately—and somewhat confusingly given the examples discussed here—Mary or Marie seems to be a popular choice for a female name in hypothetical scenarios; we have seen Mary and Marie already in cases D and E above.

Because manifestness is spelled out in terms of getting a particular proposition across this suggests that it only applies to those instances of meaning or showing that have fully determinate content. For how can a metaphor be made manifest? How can someone “believe or accept it as true” that Juliet is the sun? If manifestness is the sort of thing that can be applied only to utterances and behaviors with determinate content, then we see that manifestness applies to only a certain area of the plane, and on the opposite side from sharing an impression, as I have shown below.



5. Linguistic and non-linguistic content

Having presented the Sperber and Wilson framework I will now turn to my proposed addition to it. In their paper, Sperber and Wilson write that ‘meaning that’ is “typically achieved by the use of language” (119). They do not say that use of language is a necessary or sufficient condition for ‘meaning that’. However, all the examples Sperber and Wilson give in their schema of ‘meaning that’ are linguistic (Examples F, I, and L above). All the intermediary cases are both linguistic and non-linguistic, pointing in conjunction with uttering (Examples G, J, and M above). And all the cases of ‘showing that’ are non-linguistic (H, K, and N above).


This could be taken to suggest that the distinction between showing that and meaning that is ultimately a distinction between expressing content linguistically and non-linguistically. We might wonder whether ‘displaying evidence that’ can be achieved by linguistic means and whether ‘meaning that’ can be achieved by non-linguistic means. What are the consequences of this for a theory of speaker meaning, if any?

Despite their examples perfectly mapping on to a linguistic/non-linguistic distinction in this way, it seems that Sperber and Wilson do not want us to understand ‘meaning that’ and ‘showing that’ as a contrast between linguistic and non-linguistic reasons. Again, they do not say that use of language is a necessary or sufficient condition for ‘meaning that’, merely saying it is “typical” of ‘meaning that’.

If this is right, this suggests that there is another continuum between linguistic and non-linguistic cases of showing and meaning that

could be mapped onto the Sperber and Wilson framework as a third dimension. The resulting schema is what I call the Schema of Communicative Acts or SCA.


Schema of Communicative Acts (SCA)





Having this as a third dimension could help to distinguish the contrast between meaning/showing from expressing content linguistically/non-linguistically and better showcase the full range of possible cases of communication.

What we would want now that the new SCA framework is on the table is 27 cases, one for each point of intersection of the three variables. If this cannot be done it puts pressure on the idea that the meaning/showing distinction is not tantamount to a distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic reasons for coming to act.


Schema of Communicative Acts With 27 Intersections




We can find instances of determinate showing that are linguistic as well as non-linguistic (J, K).



Likewise, we can find determinate cases of meaning that are linguistic, as well as non-linguistic (L, M).





(M)

I will not present 27 cases here but what I have begun indicates that it can be done for all 27 intersections. These examples across all three dimensions of the SCA point us away from concluding that the meaning/showing distinction is a linguistic/non-linguistic distinction, as it may have appeared given the examples Sperber and Wilson provide.

6. *On showing*

Once we have clarified that the distinction between meaning and showing isn't tantamount to a distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic content, another question arises, pertaining to what exactly is meant by 'showing'. Showing is said to be "displaying evidence that" (2015: 119). However, this only pushes the question back. What exactly counts as "displaying"? More to the point, how intentional must showing or displaying be, and must acts of showing follow the Sperber and Wilson two-pronged framework for ostensive-inferential communication?

In colloquial use, showing can be intentional or unintentional, as in "your undershirt is showing". If showing is understood in the ordinary sense, it is safe to say that we often show things that are not relevant to the current situation. There certainly are things that are gotten across with utterances that might seem best classified as perhaps unintentional showing, or revealing, as with "I'm fine, Roy". In other words, to put it in Sperber and Wilson's terms, showing, as it is ordinarily understood, does not seem to follow the presumption of relevance.

Taking 'showing' as something looser than a technical term that follows the presumption of relevance, it is clear that we sometimes show—or convey—things we 1) intend to conceal or 2) are unaware of revealing, as in M.

M. Let's say that a man, Antonio, goes to the Metropolitan Museum of Art one day. He is given a pin that says 'MET' that he buttons onto his shirt. He later leaves the museum and rides the subway to Lincoln Center where he attends a performance of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra. Antonio sees a friend at the

concert and this friend says, "So, you went to the Met today?" Antonio replies, "How do you know?"

At the moment when he saw his friend was Antonio showing that he had been to the Met that day? Was he *displaying evidence that* he had been to the Met that day? Do we need to know more about his mental state? In other words, does showing require an intention?

These questions are important because, with showing, there seems to be a tenuous link between a conscious intention on the part of the agent and what is communicated (that is, gotten across to an interlocutor).

Perhaps an issue at hand in assessing the Met case is one of temporality. It is almost impossible for one to produce an utterance without awareness that one is producing an utterance (although it is possible to construct limited cases). Because of this fact we can presume that a speaker has deemed any utterance to meet some intention *now*. It is this fact that leads to the presumption of relevance. However, with Antonio wearing the pin at the Met the matter is thornier. At the moment he put on the pin we might say he intended to show he had paid the admission fee. We might even say he had an intention that this information continue to be available to a viewer for the duration of his visit. Is such an intention required for showing?

Recall that on the Sperber and Wilson ostensive-inferential view, the utterer must intend the addressee,

- 1) to produce a particular response *r*
- 2) to think (recognise) that the utterer intends (1)

Perhaps Sperber and Wilson wish to restrict their account of showing to those acts that satisfy these conditions. However, I believe that it is more constructive and has more explanatory power if we say that acts of showing need not meet these two conditions. Indeed, the best account of meaning and showing seems to be that meaning must satisfy these two conditions, but *showing need not*. The most explanatorily robust account of showing requires *no intention on the part of the shower*. In addition to what I see as the other benefits of this position, this account of showing, understood in a less restricted way, can account for more examples and more closely aligns with our colloquial use of the term.

Sperber and Wilson may reject this proposal and advocate instead for showing to be understood as a technical term that applies only to ostensive-inferential communication. If so, we need to know more about how to treat cases such as M. On my proposal, what we say about Antonio is straightforward: he is showing that he went to the Met all day, although he is not aware of showing for the majority of the time. If we limit showing to ostensive-inferential communication that meets the two-pronged framework some other treatment of this case is needed. If we say that showing only applies to some early moment of the Met pin application, it seems very difficult to pinpoint when this would be, and why.

Showing in case M is a process with lasting effects. These effects may or may not be intentional. Or, if they were initially intentional, may not

still be intentional by the time they are interpreted. A complete account of showing would include an explanation of how much awareness on the part of the speaker is required for it to be a genuine case of showing.

7. Motivations

A further question that arises from this closer consideration of the showing-meaning continuum and the SCA more broadly is about speaker motivations. Why would someone choose to convey meaning in one coordinate or another? The decision to use linguistic or non-linguistic means is perhaps specific to situations. If I am in Croatia, I may hold up the letter 3 to order more glasses of wine for the table rather than speak, because I do not know the language. I may say “excuse me” loudly to someone who is in my way but looking in the other direction. If I am a dancer or a visual artist, my work will be conveyed through non-linguistic means because my training is on one side of this continuum.

The determinate vs. indeterminate continuum is about the nature of the content itself. If someone chooses to express indeterminate content—be it by a sniff at the seaside, a metaphor, a poem, or an abstract painting—this is about the message itself (or here range of messages).

The decision to show or mean, via linguistic or non-linguistic means is a subsequent question about how to get that across. Recall that manifestness, the successful outcome of expressing determinate content, is an explicitly epistemic notion, the extent to which, for any given proposition, the interlocutor “is likely to some positive degree to entertain it and accept it as true” (Sperber and Wilson 2015: 134). Why would someone, on an occasion, choose to provide direct evidence of some fact rather than expect that their communicative intention alone would be enough to cause some response, r , in the hearer? The answer has to do with how they expect they will be interpreted.

Donald Davidson considers this point in his paper “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”. He writes,

An interpreter has, at any moment of a speech transaction, what I persist in calling a theory...I assume that the interpreter’s theory has been adjusted to the evidence so far available to him: knowledge of the character, dress, role, sex, of the speaker, and whatever else has been gained by the speaker’s behavior, linguistic or otherwise. As the speaker speaks his piece the interpreter alters his theory. (2006: 260)

As Davidson writes, an interpreter decides how to interpret on the basis of assessing “character, dress, role, sex, of the speaker, and whatever else has been gained by the speaker’s behavior, linguistic or otherwise” (2006: 260). As Davidson later notes, the speaker’s theory about the interpreter’s theory shapes how he chooses to attempt to convey his meaning.

I recently had a student who told me that she had to miss class because of jury duty. I said that was fine and that she should get the notes from another student. She later emailed me a photo of her jury

summons. I did not require extra evidence to believe that she had jury duty. However, she felt the need to show me direct evidence.

The fact that the student believed my recognition of her intention was insufficient for me to believe she had jury duty is likely the result of her having experienced a failure to achieve a certain result by such means in the past. Thus, learning from this experience, any rational communicator would move down the axis from meaning to showing.

That is, we might say that a speaker who chooses to provide direct evidence when his or her intention would be sufficient has had their communicative behavior modified by what has been called “testimonial injustice” (Fricker 2007)—when the interpreter’s “theory” (Davidson 2006) “causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word” (Fricker 2007: 1). Sperber and Wilson’s framework spells out of manifestness as an explicitly *epistemic* notion. This understanding of what we aim to achieve when expressing determinate content pushes us to consider the social factors that shape how a speaker would go about achieving their intended result. These social factors affect where an act will fall on the meaning-showing continuum.

8. Expression and affect

I began this paper by considering examples including ‘I’m fine, Roy’ and ‘I won’t swallow that’. Are we now in a position to resolve any of these confounding questions related to these utterances that I posed at the start? First it will helpful to map Sperber and Wilson’s notions of making manifest and sharing an impression onto the 3D continuum I have proposed.

What seems to be special about Marie uttering “I won’t swallow that” and Mary uttering “I’m fine, Roy” is that both speakers seem to be showing or *revealing* an emotional state that they are not aware of—in the case of Marie in her therapist’s office—or may be aware of but suppressing—in the case of Mary speaking to Roy. The propositional content Mary utters with “I’m fine” contradicts with what she shows by uttering “Roy”. To address what is going on such cases—and why they might be special—we must engage with work on consciousness and emotions from psychology and philosophy of mind.

There are a wide range of positions on the relationship between emotions, consciousness, affect, and utterances. Wittgenstein writes that if humans did not show outward signs of pain such as groaning or grimacing “it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word ‘tooth-ache’” (Wittgenstein 1958: 257). This account makes central the ways we *show* some of our internal bodily states.

This showing of external bodily states plays an important role in how we make hypotheses about the mental life of others. A psychotherapist may, for instance, make the assessment that a patient is in denial if they are laughing while describing the death of a parent (Jewett 1982).

Some theories of emotion place the subjective affective phenomenol-

ogy—not its visible manifestation—at the center. Jesse Prinz has argued that emotions are what he calls “embodied appraisals” and that all emotions “potentially occur with feelings of bodily changes” (Prinz 2006: 91). He is also explicit to note that on his view “all emotions can be conscious” (Prinz 2006: 91) but does not claim that all emotions *must be* conscious all the time (Prinz 2006: 201–202). Others defend the cognitive view of emotions—that to be in a mental state such as fear, is to be consciously experiencing a perceived danger (LeDoux 2017: 303).

There is a wide variety of viewpoints on whether or not emotions must be conscious. Thus, to explain the Mary and Marie cases in terms of emotions would be to muddy the waters with a number of theoretical commitments on the very point we would like to clarity. We can instead talk in terms of affect, which “can designate the whole subject matter we are discussing here: emotions, moods, feelings” (Damasio 2000: 342). Such a move is an attempt to be agnostic as to the details of the theoretical commitments made by the philosophers of mind I appeal to here.

We must, however, be conscious of an affective state for us to verbally state as much. Philosopher of mind David Rosenthal (2006) writes,

Suppose I am angry at you for doing a certain thing. If my anger is conscious, I might explicitly report the anger, by saying ‘I’m angry with you.’ Or I might express my anger nonverbally, say, by some facial expression or body language. ... when I nonverbally express my anger, the anger may or may not be conscious ...when I say ‘I am angry’ I report my anger; I do not verbally express it.. (316)



Rosenthal here introduces a distinction between “reporting” affective states and “expressing” affective states. Reporting an affective state requires awareness of that state, where expressing that affective state does not require awareness of it.

Perhaps we have a similar distinction that can be made between the sorts of contents that are meant and those that are shown. We might extend Rosenthal’s account and conclude that although things that are meant must be conscious, those that are shown need not be.

Such a move would, however, require a reply to the sorts of questions I posed about the nature of showing earlier. If showing need always be intentional this move could not be made.

However, if such a move could be made, it could be brought back to deal with cases such as Marie and her mother. We could say that Marie *showed* that she ties her mother’s being overbearing to her eating disorder, consciously or subconsciously, but not that she *meant* this by her utterance. (The linguistic vs. non-linguistic addition I suggested clears the way for this; otherwise we cannot have linguistic showing).

We can map these two contents onto the SCA as follows:



The bottom example is an instance of revealing an unconscious state. On this proposed model and understanding of showing, unconscious states may only be shown, and not meant. You cannot mean something you are unaware of meaning. You can show something you are unaware of showing.


Expression of affective states is difficult to suppress (Argyle 1975: 111–112; Damasio 2000). Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio writes, “We are about as effective at stopping an emotion as we are at preventing a sneeze. We can try to prevent the expression of an emotion and we may succeed in part but not in full” (Damasio 2000: 49). If we think of certain utterances or parts of utterances as difficult to stop as sneezes, then they clearly do not follow the presumption of relevance.

Because of this the explanation for why we produce language that reveals affective states should be understood to be different from language that is costly. To put it in Sperber and Wilson’s terms: the revealing of affective states does not seem to follow the presumption of relevance.


Not all utterances—or all parts of all utterances—are produced because of the intended effect on the hearer. Some of them are driven by affect. This awareness allows us to say something constructive about Mary and Marie from cases D and E. It also is the key piece to explaining utterances that otherwise have no clear intended effect—such as ranting about a bad day or a recent comment by the president. Utterances of this sort have their genesis more in the resulting effects on the speaker—not on the hearer—although a speaker may or may not be consciously aware of this. The continua of the SCA have provided the framework for the discussion of such complex utterances.

9. Metaphor

For my final section I will return to consider the case of metaphor I posed at the start and see how it can be treated within the SCA. Sperber and Wilson's original (1986) example of sharing an impression was Mary sniffing ostensively on the seashore. This was an instance of indeterminate meaning, and it is non-linguistic, and so will be slid back on the third proposed plane of the SCA.



'Juliet is the sun', an instance of linguistic indeterminate meaning, would fall into the following space on the proposed continua:



An utterance such as ‘Juliet is the sun’ is an instance of sharing an impression because it cannot be paraphrased without loss of meaning—Sperber and Wilson’s “test” for indeterminate content, borrowed from “the Romantics” (Wilson 2011).

Although I advocate for the modified Sperber and Wilson framework and believe it is a powerful tool that can be used to helpfully map and analyze utterance types, this does not presuppose the Sperber and Wilson account of metaphor. Metaphors such as ‘Juliet is the sun’ have been seen as problems because on the Gricean account, for a speaker to have a meaning intention a speaker must have a complex three-pronged intention with respect to the response r they intend the speaker to have. With metaphor it is hard to imagine what this would look like.

Metaphors have been raised as a problem on this view because it seems improbable that a speaker who utters a metaphor has an intention that includes *all* the meanings we would want to say are expressed by a metaphor. As I posed rhetorically at the start, if a speaker does *not* have such an intention, on the Gricean view, in virtue of what can we say that an utterance containing a metaphor has such meaning?

Griceans have responded to the apparent quandary presented by the complexity of metaphors by 1) weakening the requisite intentions, 2) oversimplifying their account of metaphors, or 3) positing dubious mental contents. This leaves one with the impression that there is some problematic ad hoc shifting taking place. Grice himself recognized the apparent problem for his view writing that some utterances may be understood as expressing an open disjunction of propositions (Grice 1989: 40; 120). However, this seems to pose a problem for what sort of mental state this would require on the part of the speaker.

Sperber and Wilson’s account of metaphor is idiosyncratic in its own way. On the relevance theoretic picture, metaphors are on a continuum with hyperbole (Wilson 2011). Deirdre Wilson writes that ‘John is a giant’ “would count as hyperbole if taken to mean that John is very tall for a human” and would count as a metaphor “if taken to mean

that John stands out for other reasons than simply his height" (Wilson 2011: 181). If it seems that the Sperber and Wilson account reduces metaphor to nothing special, that is because it does—explicitly. Sperber and Wilson embrace this, writing in their "Deflationary Account of Metaphors" that "there is no specific mechanism to metaphor, no interesting generalization that applies only to them" (Sperber and Wilson 2008: 84).

Instead, the relevance theory account of metaphor posits encyclopedic entries for concepts such as "giant" and "sleep" (Sperber and Wilson 2004; Wilson 2011). To interpret a metaphor is to choose amongst these encyclopedic entries. For example, to interpret a metaphor such as 'The audience slept through the lecture' involves choosing between sleep meaning to "a. become mentally disengaged, b. lose interest in one's surroundings c. become motionless and unresponsive, d. gradually lose consciousness, e. undergo physical changes (snoring, slowed heart-rate, deep breathing, etc.)" (Wilson 2011: 188). It is not clear how this "encyclopedia entry" would come to be a part of a hearer's mind, how discrete these categories are, or how it could work for all metaphors containing 'sleep', including novel ones.

Such accounts of metaphor fail to account for much of the richness of metaphor—albeit willingly on the part of Sperber and Wilson. Other accounts treat metaphor as something special and may seem more satisfying because of this. For instance, in the work of Dick Moran (1989) metaphors are special in virtue of their "framing effects". According to Moran, when we encounter a metaphor such as 'Jack is a refrigerator', we cannot help but conjure up a mental picture that frames Jack in some way as a refrigerator. On the Moran view, these mental effects are akin to the way we can shift to "see an aspect"—viewing Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit as a duck or a rabbit (Moran 1989: 89). To hear 'Jack is a refrigerator' is to shift from viewing Jack as an ordinary man to "see an aspect" of him in some way as a refrigerator. As Elizabeth Camp (2017) has pointed out in later work on metaphors as insults, these framing effects may be the reason such statements are not fully cancellable.

To understand metaphor in terms of sharing an impression, on the right side of the SCA, is not to come down in favor of one theory of metaphor or another.

It is not clear whether or not Sperber and Wilson are attempting to revisit and revise their previously presented account of metaphor when they present it as sharing an impression. Based on what they argued in their 2008 and 2011 "deflationary" accounts of metaphor it is difficult to see how metaphor is an instance of indeterminate content on their view. For, as argued by Wilson (2011) with the 'sleep' example metaphor *does* have determinate content, and we use the presumption of relevance to pick that content out from a finite number of encyclopedic entries. On its face this view of metaphor is quite different from sharing an impression which does not have determinate content' after

'quite different from sharing an impression'. This may be an inconsistency in what Sperber and Wilson have said about metaphor across different papers, or a misconstrual to be ironed out. If it is an inconsistency we can stick with what they argue in the 2015 paper and perhaps understand metaphor in terms of an account that more resembles Moran's framing.

Part of the apparent problem that metaphor presents for the Gricean seems to disappear when we stop seeing metaphor as expressing a range of propositions, and see it instead in terms of framing effects. It seems much more plausible that a speaker could have an intention to frame something in a way—Jack as a refrigerator—than that this speaker has a range of propositions in mind. To invite a hearer to picture this frame presents a nice parallel with Mary sniffing ostensively at the seashore.

Either way, although metaphor-qua-problem-case-for-Grice tends to be clustered in a certain part of the cube (top right), it is clear that the degree to which some intention is conscious is *distinct* from the meaning-showing, determinate-indeterminate, or linguistic-nonlinguistic continua. Seeing this can allow us to disentangle questions about the degree to which some intention is conscious from where the corresponding utterance falls within the proposed quality space.

10. Conclusion

A full account of our communicative practices will be mindful of what these distinctions mean for

- 1) our theories of meaning and
- 2) our explanations of why we engage in certain communicative acts, including showing.

The ability to handle a wide range of cases is a strength of the SCA. Sperber and Wilson's work shows the power of applying philosophy of language grounded in Grice to an array of cases, and their 2015 framework—which I hope to have strengthened—has great potential for theorizing not just about language, but about meaning-making, and the conscious and unconscious things we show, in general. Such work allows us to ask not only *how* but *why* we engage in certain forms of communicative behavior, and captures the incredible nuance of human interactions: said and meant, linguistic and non-linguistic, determinate and indeterminate.

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